











Department of Economics 




José Luis Lima 
Department of Economics 
University of Chile 
 
Abstract 
Price caps are a popular form of monopoly price regulation. One of its 
disadvantages is the perverse incentives that regulated firms might have to scamp on cost 
reducing effort during the last years before a price review. In order to avoid this problem a 
“rolling cap” contract was introduced in the United Kingdom that overcomes this last 
problem. In spite of their popularity, there is scant research on the optimal regulatory lag 
(number of years between price reviews) of a price cap or rolling cap contract. In practice, 
around the world most price cap or rolling cap contracts have a lag of 4 to 5 years, but this 
is not based on any optimality consideration.  As is well known, the regulatory lag 
determines the power of an incentive contract and thus the incentives to undertake cost 
reducing effort. 
Schmalensee (1989) studied the optimal power of regulatory contracts in a static 
model with uncertainty and asymmetric information. She finds that medium powered 
contracts are generally superior to the polar cases of high or low powered contracts. In this 
paper, we extend Schmalensee (1989) model used to study the optimal power of regulatory 
contracts to a dynamic framework. We use numerical simulation to study the optimal 
regulatory lag for different combinations of demand and cost parameters under a particular 
linear quadratic structure. We find that in general a 2 year lag is optimal under both a price 
cap and rolling cap contracts and that a benevolent regulator prefers the rolling cap over the 
price cap contract in almost all the cases.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes the optimal time lag between price reviews in natural monopoly 
regulation. Most countries that adopted incentive based regulation during the liberalization 
and privatization wave of the eighties and nineties applied a fixed regulatory lag of 4 to 5 
years between price reviews.  In countries such as Chile, a pioneer in privatization of public 
utilities, tariffs are set in real terms for a five year period in the water, electricity and 
telecoms sector.  In Argentina, price caps were adopted in almost all concession contracts 
with price reviews every five years (except for the first period in some sectors). In the 
United Kingdom’s RPI-X price cap system, price reviews for the gas, electricity and water 
sectors occur every five years while in telecoms and rail it is four years. In all of these 
cases, the length of the period between price reviews seems to have been adopted more by 
convention and administrative convenience rather than careful consideration of the 
economic costs and benefits of different lag periods.   
 
The idea behind price cap regulation is that by fixing prices for a period of time, firms 
would be residual claimants to profits generated by cost reducing effort (or would suffer the 
losses from cost increases) and thus would have strong incentives to increase productive 
efficiency (Littlechild, 1983). A price cap regime with a fixed lag between reviews would 
overcome some of the inefficiencies purported to characterize traditional regulatory 
schemes such as rate of return regulation (sometimes also called cost plus regulation). In 
the parlance of incentive theory a pure cap regime would be a ‘high powered’ mechanism 
while rate of return regulation is a ‘low powered’ scheme.    
 
In spite of the clear incentive properties of a price cap regime, under asymmetric 
information there are also disadvantages to this high powered regulatory contract. A 
regulator may not know the cost reduction potential of a company and may set prices too 
high.
2  This will harm consumers and generate allocative inefficiencies since prices would 
                                                 
2 If a regulator has a prior belief regarding the cost potential of the firm and has to guarantee a non-negative 
profit for all types of firms, he then has to set tariffs according to the upper bound of the distribution of 
beliefs. If the firm turns out to be more efficient than this pessimistic assumption then it will earn an above 
average profit rate.   
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be above costs until the next price review. A similar phenomenon occurs if there are 
unexpected cost shocks that affect the firm’s costs after tariffs are set. Prices will again be 
out of line with costs until the next price review.  
 
That regulators often underestimate the capacity of firms to reduce costs can be shown by a 
series of examples. In the first price review after privatization of the United Kingdom water 
sector, the regulator believed companies’ costs would rise during the next five years as a 
consequence of new environmental regulations imposed by the European Union. In 
accordance, the regulator set the X factor in the RPI-X formula to be -2%. Thus, water 
charges increased by 2% in real terms during the period 1995-1999. Ex-post it turned out 
that the regulator had underestimated how much companies could cut costs. Operating costs 
were reduced by 12% during the period. Users suffered the consequences of higher than 
necessary charges for an extended period of time. The high rates of return earned by 
privatized Chilean public utilities during the 90’s also attest to the difficulty regulators have 
in setting prices at their efficient level.
3  
 
The optimal regulatory mechanism will trade-off the incentive properties of a high-powered 
scheme with the allocative, distributive and rent extracting properties of a lowered powered 
one. Theory suggests that the optimal regulatory contract under asymmetric information is 
to offer regulated firms a menu of contracts, the majority of which are medium powered 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
4  If only one contract can be offered, the results of Schmalensee 
(1989) suggest that a medium tolow contract is optimal. In these models, the power of the 
contract is given by the parameters of a profit sharing rule. Price-cap and cost-plus 
regulation are polar cases of this profit sharing rule.   
 
One reason why the above theoretical results have not had much eco in regulatory practice 
stems from the administrative difficulties associated with the implementation of a profit 
                                                 
3 See the articles in Meller (2002) for a review of the Chilean regulatory experience during the last decade. 
Rates of return in the electricity and the regulated telecom sectors were very high, reaching 50% in some 
cases and with 30% being common for some companies. The water sector was privatized during the late 
nineties so it cannot be compared.  
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sharing rule. Regulators would have to monitor profits on a constant basis, rather than once 
during the price review period. There are many ambiguities in the practical measure of 
profits and ample accounting discretion can be used to manipulate these figures. Under a 
profit sharing scheme there would be strong incentives for regulated companies to use 
profit accounts as a strategic variable. Regulators would need stronger auditing capacities 
than under price-cap regulation. The latter is supposed to be more forward looking 
(projected future profits matter more than past profits in setting prices) in comparison to a 
profit sharing scheme which is dependent on past profits.      
 
Thus, it would seem that only the polar cases of a high powered price-cap contract or a low 
power rate of return scheme are relevant for practical applications and the results of the 
theory of regulation would be irrelevant. However, this is incorrect. It is well known that 
one can alter the power of a price-cap contract by changing the regulatory lag period 
between price reviews. In the limiting case where price reviews are undertaken on a 
continuous basis, the price-cap regime collapses to a pure cost-plus regime. A longer 
regulatory lag increases the power of a regulatory scheme, providing more incentives to 
firms to undertake cost reducing effort. In a pure price-cap regime, where regulated firms 
face maximum incentives for cost reductions, the regulatory lag is infinite. Existing price-
cap contracts are essentially of intermediate power since the regulatory lag is finite (4 to 5 
years).  
 
Rolling cap contracts are a variant of price caps introduced recently in the United Kingdom. 
Under a price cap regime the observed costs of a firm during the last years before a price 
review have a strong influence on the prices set for the next period. Therefore the firm’s 
incentives to reduce costs are weakened as the price review period approaches. In order to 
eliminate this bias, under a rolling price regime a firm is allowed to keep any cost reduction 
for a fixed number of years irrespective of whether there is a price review in between. For 
example, if the regulatory lag is five years and a firm reduces its costs on the third year into 
                                                                                                                                                     
4 The model proposed by Baron and Myerson (1982) also results in a menu of contracts offered. However, in 
this case the regulator is assumed not to observe costs and therefore the only mechanism to extract rents are 
through price distortions.   
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the price period, then this cost reduction will not be reflected in tariffs until the third year of 
the next pricing period.  
 
Notice that the change from a price cap to a rolling cap implies an increase in the power of 
the regulatory scheme. In view of the trade-off between incentives and allocative 
efficiency, if the regulatory lag before this change was optimal, then the lag should be 
shortened when a rolling cap is introduced. This was not done in the UK. Therefore, either 
the lag was not considered to be optimal initially or it is currently suboptimal. This paper 
will shed some light as to the quantitative importance of shortening the regulatory lag when 
a rolling cap contract is introduced. 
 
To date little research has been undertaken to determine whether the regulatory lags of 
existing regulatory contracts are optimal not in light of the economic trade-offs emphasized 
in the theoretical literature. Besides Armstrong, Rees and Vickers (1995) not much has 
been written explicitly on this topic. However, all of the literature on the optimal power of 
incentive contracts bears on this issue. Schmalensee (1989) is noteworthy in this sense. She 
examined, using numerical methods for a matrix of parameter values, the optimal cost 
sharing rule for a simple linear contract. As mentioned above his result was that the optimal 
contract was in most cases of medium power (neither a pure cost-plus nor a pure price-cap). 
However the static nature of his model makes it difficult to inform real world policy 
questions.  
 
In this paper we extend Schmalensee’s model to a dynamic setting to study ‘good’ 
regulatory lags using the same parameter matrix as in his paper. We are thus able to obtain 
conclusions that may be more readily applied to real policy questions. Changing the 
regulatory lag of a price-cap contract or even offering a menu of price-cap contracts with 
different regulatory lags is probably easier than introducing a profit-sharing regulatory 
contract. 
 
Even the simple static model presented in Schmalensee (1989) is computationally 
demanding. Its extension to a dynamic setting increases the number of parameters of the 
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model and raises a series of technical difficulties. We solve these difficulties using 
recursive methods to determine the optimal behavioral variables of the model and use 
numerical techniques to find quantitative solutions. 
 
The paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 introduces the general framework we use to 
study the monopoly and regulator problems under different regulatory regimes.  In section 
3 we made some particular assumptions about the functional form of demand, disutility of 
effort, costs, law of motion of the shock and regulator’s beliefs so the problem meet the 
conditions to be analized as a Linear Quadratic Problem.  We also show some interesting 
results about the observed behaviour of the effort exerted under different regimes.  In 
section 4 we define the parameter values and the algorithms to be used on the simulations.  
In section 5 we place some results obtained under the last section particular conditions and 
conclude. 
  
2. The  model 
 
Time is discreet.  The Regulator and the monopolist sign a contract at t = 0.  The contract 
lasts for infinite periods with price revisions every J periods, where J is the “regulatory 
lag”.  The Regulator can also opt to not intervene in the industry and let the monopoly free 
to fix prices.  From t = 1 the Monopoly starts production and sells, taking as given the 
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where pt is the price fixed by the regulator (if she lets the monopoly fixes the price, this is 
also part of its decision variables); J is the regulatory lag of the contract (if the monopoly 
fixes the price, J=0); et is the monopoly’s effort level in reducing unit costs at t; ct is the 
unitary cost of producing Q units of a homogeneous no storable good, which depends on 
the last period unit cost, on the current period effort level and on a stochastic shock εt that is 
materialized immediately after et is exerted:  this means that the decision of the current 
period effort level has to be made in terms of the expected value of the unit cost at t, e.g. 
) / ( 1 − t t t c E ε , that makes sense if there exits some kind of short term planning. 
 
Because of the constant returns to scale the unit cost equals both marginal and mean 
production costs.  We absorb from the existence of sunk costs that generates natural 
barriers to entry in the industry.  The stochastic shock follows a stationary 1
st order markov 
process.  Q (pt) is the demand function the monopoly faces at the market, whose functional 
form is constant and depends negatively on the current period price.  ψ( et; ϕ ) is a concave 
function that represents the pecuniary cost or contemporary disutility of effort  that the 
manager of the monopoly suffers when carrying out et; the intensity of the disutility   
depends on ϕ ∈ ℜ+ that determines the different types of monopolies the regulator may 
face.   ) , ( J ϕ Π  is the discounted present value of the net benefits that a monopoly type ϕ 
with price revisions every J periods expects. 
 
The timing of the problem at each period is the following:   
The firm decides and executes an effort level (and decides the price when it keeps 




Once the effort is carried out (and the price is chosen), εt is materialized and observed. 
The monopoly produces at the current cost and sells in the market all the quantity that is 
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There is a risk neutral benevolent regulator with a priori beliefs about the efficiency of the 
firm (ϕ) summarized by a continuous distribution function  f(ϕ).  The Regulator may offer 
to the monopoly two contractual forms:  a Price Cap and a Rolling Cap contract (Cost Plus 
is possible when J = 1).   
 
A Price Cap contract establishes price revisions every J periods:  at the revision period the 
regulator can observe the previous periods total costs and production levels and use that 
information to determine the unit cost that will be established as the new price that will  
prevail from that period until the next revision.   
 
In a Rolling Cap contract, the regulator fixes the current period price equals to the unit cost 
realized J periods before (during the first J periods immediately after the sign of the 
contract, the price equals c0).   
 
Like Armstrong et. al. (1995) we implicitly assume that the regulator can commit to respect 
the price fixed at each revision until the next one.  We also assume that before the sign of 
the contract the Regulator chooses a J for each contractual form and commits to respect it 
forever.  There are two reasons for this and to not find a sequence { } t J   contingent to the 
last observed and relevant unit cost:   
  
♦ 
                                                
The Regulator is usually a governmental agency which may have different objectives 
than that of a benevolent regulator.  It could also happen that the monopoly “captures” 
the agency and make her fixes a J that permits the former to obtain higher benefits
6.  
Avoiding high discretion in regulator’s decisions may result in better results.  It would 
also prevent the waste of scant resources the monopoly may be interested to spend to 
obtain higher lags and softer control (rent-seeking and even corrupt practices). 
 
 
5   That makes sense if there exists a legal norm demanding that the regulated firm self finances its operations 
at every period  (mean cost tariffication).  
 
6   It can be observed continuously higher Jt s that allows the monopoly to be the residual plaintiff of its cost 
savings for more time than the socially optimal one, maybe without a significant descent in observed prices 
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The second reason is that although having a single J can generate potential dynamic 
inconsistency problems, because a benevolent regulator may wish to diminish or 
increase J in face of new information about costs and shock, the quality of the new 
information about costs (and shock) may be bad, such that it can be better to have ex 
ante a fixed rule that obtains on average an acceptable reduction in costs.   
♦ 
 
If for these or other reasons a fixed rule for J is preferred, then it will still be important that 
the regulator commits her to respect it for the whole relationship in a credible way if she 
wants to keep reputation when fixing regulatory lags for future contracts in other industries.  
This doesn't mean that, according to the characteristics of an industry, the Regulatory lag  
differs from one industry to another; what really matters is for the fixed J to be respected.  
 
The regulator doesn't know in advance the monopoly’s type (ϕ) at the time she chooses the 
regulatory lag that optimizes her expected value function, so she has to do it  according to 
the expected value on the distribution of types too.  Her objective value function, called W, 
is composed by the weighted sum of the Expected Discounted Present Value of the 
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where λ measures the degree of importance that the regulator gives to the firm relative to 
the consumers.  The regulator wishes the monopoly wants to participate, but because she 
doesn't know a priori the monopoly’s type she should satisfy the Participation Constraint of 
every possible type. 
 
The weight λ indicates that there exist reasons so that the regulator worries more about 
consumer’s surplus than for the firm’s benefits.  Some of them can be subjective or political 
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but others can have economic meaning:  a) allocative efficiency requires prices equal to 
marginal cost at every period, hence, fixing prices for J periods can improve only 
productive efficiency if demand is not perfectly inelastic (Armstrong et. al., 1995).  b) The 
weight can reflect the existence of hidden costs in obtaining and processing the necessary 
information to fix prices at each revision (audits and the maintenance of a regulatory 
agency are costly) that has to be covered by means of distortionary taxes. 
 
The regulator doesn't know in advance which type of monopoly she’ll have in front, as well 
as she cannot identify it after because she will not be able to observe the effort and shock 
composition of the cost level at any revision.  This is due because both price cap and rolling 
cap contracts, even though they give strong incentives to carry out effort they are not 
designed as truthful revealing mechanisms (that is evident with the absence of an incentive 
compatibility restriction in the regulator’s problem).  Hence, the regulator will never be 
sure about the monopoly’s type and as a consequence her beliefs, in an extreme case used 
here, won’t be revised.  
 
It is nevertheless assumed that the resulting unitary cost can be fully identified at each 
revision period as well as corroborated and audited.  Even though Baron and Myerson 
(1982) suggest that there may exist some degree of asymmetry even in the cost information 
that manages the regulator and the monopoly that favours the later, we follow Laffont and 
Tirole (1986) and assume that costs are observable.   
 
The regulator also calculates the W of not regulating the monopoly and compares it with the 
W of regulating the monopoly with Price Cap or Rolling Cap.  As the functional forms are 
the same ones at each case, direct comparison of the Ws from each regulatory regime will 
show us which option is better for the regulator. 
 
The initial cost and shock, the functional forms of the (no stochastic) demand, disutility of 
effort, unitary costs and the stochastic process for εt are common knowledge at the time of 
the sign of the contract.  The Regulator and the monopoly share the same discount rate. 
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2.1  Unregulated Monopoly’s Problem 
 
If the monopoly was not regulated it could exercise market power through the election of 
the price at every period.  Supposing that the regulator studies the possibility of not 
regulates the monopoly, the problem that a monopoly type ϕ has to solve is: 
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We have supposed that both effort and price are chosen before the contemporary shock is 
materialized.  Given the monopoly’s objective function, the price decision can be obtained 
by solving the problem at every period, e.g.: 
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that for pt results in the Lerner rule for a single product monopoly (defining 
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From this rule we can determine that the monopoly price will be a function of the level of 
the expected cost at every period ( ) that is at the same time a function of the 
level of contemporary effort. 




t c p p =
 
Having found the way in which the monopoly fixes prices, we now solve for its level of 
effort.  In this case, the monopoly’s problem can be expressed by means of dynamic 
programming.  Let the state variables at each period be the previous period cost and shock, 
and let the effort at each period be the decision variable.  Then we can define the functional 
) , ( 1 1 − − t t c V ε  that summarizes the monopoly’s optimized problem at t, as: 
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The FOC of this problem together with the Benveniste-Sheinkman conditions, gives rise to 
the Euler equation that implicitly determines the effort that the monopoly will carry out at 
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the first equation establishes the equality among the Present Value of the net marginal 
benefit of an increase in effort at period t, and the marginal cost incurred by the manager to 
exercise it.  The effort carried out today influences marginal benefits both today and in the 
future by affecting present and future unitary costs levels that influence present and future 
price decisions, also affecting present and future delivered quantities through its effect on 
prices.  The limit condition establishes that the monopoly doesn’t have to expect 
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extraordinary earnings or losses if there is a variation in the level of costs it begins with at 
every period (it must not discontinuously rise or low the levels of future costs). 
 
 
2.2  Monopoly’s Problem under Price Cap 
 
Under Price Cap the monopoly calculates its benefit based on the announcement of J from 
the regulator at the moment of the sign of the contract.  We will assume that at each 
revision the regulator will fix the price that the monopoly will charge to the public until the 
next revision equals to the last unitary cost.
7 
 
To model this problem it is convenient to use a special notation:  let   be the value that 
takes the variable x at period t after having passed τ price revisions; if the lapse of time 
between revisions lasts for J periods, t can take values from 1 to J; τ takes values from 1 to 
infinite (it is considered that the first price revision happens at the moment of the sign of 
the contract when the regulator fixes the initial price equals to c0).  Let also   be the 






With this notation we can define the monopoly’s problem like this:  
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We also make the following definitions that complete the transition of costs and 
technological shocks from one revision period to another:   ,   .  In order 
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monopoly decides or plans the sequence of effort to carry out for the following J periods  
after each revision, using only the information contained in c  and   (that is reasonable if 
there is some kind of medium term planning).  The problem of the monopoly can be 
expressed through dynamic programming, defining the functional that summarizes the 
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The FOC originates a system of equations for the levels of effort in every period until the 
next revision, summarized by (define c ):  , ˆ ) / ( ˆ 1 0 1
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and using the conditions of Benveniste-Sheinkman we can obtain the following expression 
that implicitly defines the effort at every period: 
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7  As in Schmalensee (1989) we assume that the fixed price serves as a roof as well as a floor. 
  14 
The first equation establishes the equality among the Expected Present Value of the Net 
Marginal Benefit of exercising additional effort with the marginal pecuniary cost it causes.  
The limit condition establishes that the monopoly doesn't expect extraordinary future 




2.3  Monopoly’s Problem under Rolling Cap 
 
Under a Rolling Cap contract the monopoly takes as given the announcement of J made by 
the regulator at the moment of the sign of the contract.  The regulator also fixes the price 
for each period equals to the unitary cost obtained by the monopoly J periods back.  As 
there is no information of the corresponding past costs during the first J periods of the 
contract, the regulator fixes the prices for those periods equal to c0. 
 
We can define the problem of the monopoly as: 
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This problem can also be expressed with dynamic programming: 
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The FOC of this problem together with the envelope conditions originates the expression 
that implicitly determines the optimal level of effort the monopoly carries out at every 
period, noticing that the value function has as arguments two different period levels of costs 
(define  c ) , , ( ˆ ) / ( ˆ 1 1 1 − + + − + + − + + + + = = i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t e c c c E ε ε , for i ≥ 0): 
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The first equation equals the Present Value of the net Marginal Benefits of exercising 
additional effort in the current period, and the marginal pecuniary cost of carrying out this 
effort.  The transversality condition has the same spirit as the first two cases.  
 
 
3.  Particular Case:  A Linear Quadratic Approach 
 
In order to get some results about the election of J, it is necessary to assume some 
functional forms for demand, disutility of the effort and unitary costs, as well as for the law 
of motion of the shock and the regulator’s beliefs over types; it will also be necessary to use 
numerical methods to obtain them. 
 
3.1  Functional form for demand. 
 
A more general lineal structure than Schmalensee (1989) is assumed, that will allow us to 
better isolate the effect of the price elasticity of demand: 
t t p b a p Q − = ) ( 
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3.2  Functional form for the Disutility of effort. 
 










e =  
and we don't discard the possibility that the monopoly decides to exercise a negative level 
of effort in some period.  Due to its quadratic form it implies that a given level of effort 
causes the manager the same disutility level even if it is positive or negative.   
 
Intuition and literature suggest an asymmetric treatment depending on the sign of effort, 
giving it a higher weight when positive but a smaller or null weight when negative.   
However we have three reasons to prefer this functional form just as it is:  The first one is 
that if the manager chooses to carry out negative effort at any period, in spite of the fact 
that it is also expensive for him, then it becomes clear that the incentives to do it are quite 
strong and we should see an even higher negative level when using asymmetric functional 
forms.  The second reason is that negative effort can be interpreted as a deliberate decision 
of the monopoly’s manager to make the costs go up, which implies that she should also 
make effort to obtain this with its respective objective and subjective costs.   
 
The third reason is rather a numerical one, as it will be seen later on, so that the numerical 
solution of this particular case, using standard techniques, needs the matrix that 
accompanies the effort to be negative definite, and we make it sure with this functional 
form.  In any case, trying to use some asymmetric functional form would make the problem 
unnecessarily complex for the effects of the question to be responded in this paper.   
 
However it could be reasonable to expect that the monopoly’s cost and its investments 
decitions are under tight regulatory control, so she cannot deliberatedly try to rise her costs.  
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As will become clear later this may affect the election of the regulatory lag under a Price 
Cap contract, so we expect to meet this posible limitation in subsequent work under a 
different particular structure. 
 
3.3  Functional form for the Unitary Costs. 
 
The unitary cost should commit at least 2 reasonable conditions:  it must respond 
negatively to effort, and it should always be positive.   
 
Because the general cost function assumes that the effort exercised at one period affects 
also the level of costs in subsequent periods, we can take two ways to model it (suppose for 
the moment that there is no random shocks):  we can assume that the effect of effort is 
permanent, so a unit of effort exercised at one period diminishes proportionally both the 
contemporary and future levels of costs without having its effect disappear over time; the 
second way is to assume that as time goes the effect of a unit of effort carried out today will 
eventually disappear over time, like a sort of “depreciation” of effort. 
 
As the common way of reducing costs is related with investments in new technology and 
equipment and/or with more efficient ways of resource administration, it should be 
expected that as time passes the firm incurs in additional costs of maintenance (the 
equipment may need a specialized and expensive technical body) and quick depreciation of 
high tech equipments; or in the case of using more efficient ways of administration, these 
cannot be exempt of continous surveillance, control, preparation and motivation of the 
company’s human resources under the new outlines that maintains the efficiency gains. 
 
The case of a permanent effect of effort is not intuitively reasonable, therefore we will use 
the focus of effort depreciation through time.  This implies that the monopoly’s effort will 
be split between two ends:  a part that will maintain the level of cost reached in previous 
periods, and a part that will obtain a new cost reduction within the period. 
 
Hence, we will use the following functional form for the unitary costs: 
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t c c t t t ∀ ≤ − = 1 , ) 1 ( 0 θ θ  
 
where c0 is the initial cost level the monopoly begins with before the signature of the 
regulatory contract, and θt is the percentage cost reduction (increase) at t in respect of c0.  
Notice that although θt  ≤  1 so the cost is positive, there is no restriction on θt to be 
nonnegative: the monopoly can exert negative effort or receive a shock such that the cost in 
t can overcome the initial cost.  The dynamics of θt are given by: 
 
0 , 1 0 , 0 1 = < ≤ + + = − θ ρ ε ρθ θ t t t t e  
 
where ρ picks the idea that only a fraction of the cost reduction gained at previous periods 
spends to the following (when ρ = 0 then each period effort affects costs just on that period, 
with a total reversion to c0 at the beginning of the next one); et is the monopoly’s effort 
level exerted at t; εt  is the random shock materialized immediately after the effort is carried 
out at the corresponding period. 
 
Note three important details in this specification:   
 
1) ρ < 1 implies that when et = 0 then ct will ascend towards c0, and when et < 0 the cost 
will go up towards c0 faster and more permanently;  
 
                                                 
8     We can complicate a little bit the analysis by assuming that the cost reducing effort has a certain probability of 
success.  Armstrong et. al. (1995) assumes that the probability in which cost decreases from one period to another is a 
function of the effort carried out at every period, making endogenous the probability of success.  Another way to do it 






= = < ≤ + + = − p y probabilit with
p y probabilit with
k e k t t t t t t 1 0
1
, 0 , 1 0 , 0 1 θ ρ ε ρθ θ  
 
that would introduce an additional parameter (p) to include in the simulations.  In this work we will assume that the effort 
is 100% effective (p = 1). 
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2) when placing εt directly on the θt’s equation, we are implicitly assuming that it follows 
the same logic than effort; hence, εt > 0 diminishes the cost at t but its effect disappears in 
later periods, and εt < 0 raises costs faster.  We can think on εt > 0 as a technological 
improvement in equipments that also depreciates, or a non waited increment in the 
efficiency of the administration (hiring a more laborious group of workers than expected, 
for example) that should also be fomented and controlled later on. 
 
3) even though the former two don’t represent a serious drawback for our purposes,  there 
is another detail that is important and is given by the linearity of θt on εt , which is 
unfortunately necessary to apply the linear quadratic framework:  depending on a particular 
history and  realization of εt, θt may be greater than 1.  Hence, we will only warrant for θt to 
be less than 1 in steady state when εt = 0 for all t.
9   
 
3.4  Law of motion for the shock in costs. 
 
The shock follows a 1
st order stationary Markov process that for continuous states can be 
represented by a 1
st order stationary autoregressive process like this: 
 
) , 0 ( ~ , 1 0 ,
2
1 σ µ β µ ε β ε N t t t t < < + = −  
 
where  t µ  is an i.i.d. innovation occurred at t.  The reason for the positive autocorrelation 
assumed in the process is that it is plausible that a persistent technological shock will keep 
its sign at every t. 
 
3.5   Analytical expression for effort at each regulatory regime. 
 
                                                 
9   We plan to meet this caveat on subsequent work, using a more general framework than the linear quadratic, 
but many interesting results can still be obtained. 
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Given the previous functional forms, the equation that determines the effort level for each 
regulatory regime takes the following form (let it be  ) / ( ˆ 1 − + + + + ≡ i t i t i t i t c E c ε  and   
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Even in this particular case it cannot be settle down analytically which regulatory regime 
generates a higher level of effort at every period.  To understand the complexity of this task 
we can analyze the steady state of the non stochastic problem and prove that the effort 
under Rolling Cap is higher than that of an unregulated monopoly if 1 .  Even in 
this case it is not possible to rank Price Cap with the others. 
5 . 0 > −
J δ
 
When we made the simulations we observed that the effort exerted by an unregulated 
monopoly and under Rolling Cap is always positive and quite stable at any period.  Even 
though it is not evident in the effort expression for Price Cap, it is observed on the 
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simulations that the expectational term is negative, which indicates that in the expected 
effect of today’s effort it weighs more the reduction in benefits due to the fall in fixed future 
prices than the increase in benefits due to increments in demanded quantity  (because of 
littler fixed prices), and the former effect becomes stronger as the next revision 
approaches: it makes the sequence of effort to decline between revisions, consistent with 
Armstrong et. al.  
 
The effort level under Price Cap can be negative in those periods just before the next 
revision if the expectation term is sufficiently large:  intuitively, because the cost used to fix 
prices is the last one obtained just before the revision, the monopoly (including 
stockholders as subsequent cost reduction becomes harder and requires the use of profits) 
has strong incentives to make it as high as possible so being less demanded for the 
following periods.  The effort level is reduced below the minimum necessary to maintain 
the gain of previous period and even more so as to increase the level of costs. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the main characteristics of the effort that are consistently 
observed on all Price Cap parameterizations:  the effort sequence always falls as the next 
revision period becomes closer at an increasing rate, and what is interesting to notice, 
complementary to Armstrong et. al. (1995), is that as J becomes higher the absolute level of 
effort at each period increases.  Hence, the total surplus generated by the monopoly’s effort 
will be smaller the lower is the time left to the monopoly to enjoy its cost reductions, a 
result similar in spirit to that of Williamson (1997).
10  
 
Notice that the level of the negative effort is also encouraged by higher lags.  This is 
because higher lags result in effort sequences which are higher at initial periods, such that  
the monopoly enjoys the generated surplus for more periods before the revision; as the 
revision comes closer the best thing for him to do is to deliberately try to rise its costs: the 
higher the effort at initial periods the lower or even more negative is the effort needed to 
overcome it, such that the regulator fixes an starting high price level in the next revision. 
                                                 
10   His work looks for the best proportion of surplus to be passed over to consumers, fixing J = 5, and finds 
that a higher proportion discourages monopoly’s effort and reduces total surplus. 
  22 
 
Figures 5 and 6 present the main differences between effort levels of the regulatory 
regimes that are consistently observed in the simulations.  The lowest average level of 
effort is the one of the unregulated monopoly, even though it could be higher than that of a 
Price Cap before price revisions.  Immediately after each revision, the Price Cap level of 
effort is the highest but quickly falls below the Rolling Cap level in subsequent periods.  
The Rolling Cap effort is higher on average than that of an unregulated monopoly at every 
period.  We can also observe that the unregulated monopoly and Rolling Cap’s effort are 
both positive and stable (lightly growing after the sign of the contract but stabilizing few  
periods ahead). 
 
We can rationalize the lower average effort level of the unregulated Monopoly as follows:  
we have assumed that effort reduces the monopoly’s unitary cost, and under constant 
returns it implies that it reduces its marginal cost too.  The unregulated monopoly 
maximizes benefits at every period by equalizing expected marginal cost with marginal 
income, choosing quantity and sales price.  Given an initial marginal cost the monopoly 
sets the price   and obtains benefits  ; if marginal income is a decreasing function the 
effort will not only reduce marginal cost but also  .  At one hand   increases because 
the smaller marginal cost allows the monopoly to sell to more consumers and get some 
surplus; and on the other hand   diminishes because total revenues fall because   
falls.  The net effect on   depends on the elasticity of demand.  Under Price Cap and 














Also, under   the optimal quantity is smaller than under marginal cost pricing, so a cost 
reduction generates a proportionally smaller surplus for an unregulated monopoly than 
under Price Cap or Rolling Cap regimes. The sum of all these effects implies that the 
monopoly will have greater incentives to make effort under a Rolling Cap and at least 
during the first periods of a Price Cap regime.  
M p1
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Figure 3 
 
First Sequence of Effort after the sign of a Price Cap contract 
under Parameter Values:  E = 1.8, δ = 0.7, λ = 1, σ = 0.04, β = 0.95,  
d = 0.9, ρ = 0.7, D = 0.3.  Initial Shock ε0 = 0.  Regulatory Lag J = 4, 6 and 8 


























































First Sequence of Effort after the sign of a Price Cap contract 
under parameter Values of:  E = 0.2, δ = 0.5, λ = 0.25, σ = 0.04, β = 0.95,  
d = 0.9, ρ = 0.9, D = 0.05.  Initial Shock ε0 = 0.  Regulatory Lag J = 4, 6 and 8 
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Figure 5 
 
First Sequence of effort after the sign of a Price Cap and Rolling Cap  
contracts, and Unregulated Monopoly for Parameter Values:  E = 1.8,  
δ = 0.7, λ = 1, σ = 0.04, β = 0.95, d = 0.9, ρ = 0.7, D = 0.3.  ε0 = 0.  J = 8. 
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First Sequence of effort after the sign of a Price Cap and Rolling Cap  
contracts, and Unregulated Monopoly for Parameter Values:  E = 0.2,  
δ = 0.5, λ = 0.25, σ = 0.04, β = 0.95, d = 0.9, ρ = 0.9, D = 0.05.  ε0 = 0.  J = 4. 
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11    The initial sequences of effort in Rolling Cap and Unregulated Monopoly are obtained assuming that 
εt = 0 for the corresponding periods, to make them comparable with those of the Price Cap. 
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3.6    Regulator’s beliefs about the monopoly’s efficiency types.  
 
As in Schmalensee (1989) we suppose the Regulator has beliefs over possible cost savings.  
In particular she thinks that the maximum percentage saving in costs that a monopoly can 
meet per year has a uniform distribution between D(1-d) and D(1+d), e.g. on average the 
monopoly can make a maximum percentage cost saving per annum of D%, with a 
minimum of D(1-d)% and a maximum of D(1+d)%, where d measures the uncertainty the 
regulator has about it.  
 
To associate this belief with the possible monopoly’s types, the regulator mentally solves a 
Pure Price Cap (or Pure Rolling Cap) placing J → ∞,  obtaining the effort level carried out 
on this situation and comparing it directly with his a priori distribution of maximum 
percentage cost saving. 
 
Under Pure Price Cap (or Pure Rolling Cap), the resulting effort level for every period is 
constant and independent of the random shock, and is given by: 
 
) 1 (






c b a c
e  
 
The regulator uses this expression an her beliefs on the maximum saving in costs to obtain 
the implied distribution of types f(ϕ), which is also uniform between  min ϕ = ωD(1-d) and 
max ϕ = ωD(1+d), with 
) (
) 1 (




ω , that define the most inefficient and efficient type 
of monopoly respectively. 
 
3.7    Regulator’s Problem. 
 
As we have already seen, when deciding the regulatory lag (J) the benevolent regulator has 
to maximize a social welfare function that may give different weights to consumer and 
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monopoly’s surplus (by means of λ).  Using the assumed particular functions we can 
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where  V ) , ; ( 0 J x ϕ is the Value function of a monopoly type ϕ with price revisions every J 
periods at the moment of the signing of the contract.  The vector x0  contains the 
monopoly’s state variables initial values, which are common knowledge; which variable is 
considered as a state will depend on the particular contractual relationship.  Note that the 
expected Present Value of the Consumer’s net surplus also depends on the price fixed by 
the regulator and so indirectly on the monopoly’s type. 
 
With regard to the participation constraints for all types of monopoly, because we are using 
the same functional forms as Schmalensee (1989) we know that V(.) grows with ϕ, so 
higher levels of efficiency are accompanied by higher benefits for the same level of the 
state variables.  We know from the past expressions that at the optimum a higher ϕ implies 
a higher level of effort at every period and therefore a smaller unitary cost; the disutility of 
effort increases because of effort but also diminishes because of the increase in ϕ.  That V(.) 
is growing in ϕ means that the smaller expected unitary cost at every period generates an 
increase of 1st. order in benefits, and that the disutility of the effort causes a 2
nd order 
decrease, so the net effect is positive. 
 
The previously exposed justifies the following objective function for the Regulator, used in 
the simulations:   
 


































) ( . . . .
0 ) , ; ( . .















E Surplus Cons Net V P E
J x V t s
d f J x V Surplus Cons Net V P E W
 
 
The integral that defines the Expected Value has to be approximated using a Gauss – 
Legendre Quadrature Rule whose motivation is in Appendix 3.   
 
 
4.  Starting simulations:  Election of Parameters and Algorithms 
 
In our model one period of time represents one year.  It was chosen the following parameter 
values for the simulation exercise:   
 
E  ∈    { 0.2 , 0.6 , 1 , 1.4 , 1.8 }   
δ  ∈    { 0.1 , 0.3 , 0.5 , 0.7 , 0.9 }   
λ  ∈    { 0 , 0.25 , 0.5 , 0.75 , 1 }  
β  ∈    { 0.05 , 0.25 , 0.5 , 0.75 , 0.95 }   
d  ∈    { 0.1 , 0.3 , 0.5 , 0.7 , 0.9 }   
D  ∈    { 0.008 , 0.018 , 0.028 , 0.038 }   
ρ  ∈    { 0.6 , 0.7 , 0.8 , 0.9 }   
σ  ∈    { 0.008 , 0.018 , 0.028 , 0.038 }   
 
The values for E, d, δ and λ are the same as in Schmalensee (1989) and it seems reasonable 
to explore them also in this context.  For the case of D we may think that the percentage 
saving in costs due to incentives has an average annual maximum of 3.8%.
12  A  
                                                 
12   Schmalensee (1989) suggests a maximum of 20% cost saving as directly attributable to incentives.  At that 
time it was frequently observed Price Cap contracts that lasts between 10 to 15 years, implying an average 
cost reduction of 2% to 1.3% per year.  The water sector in UK, regulated with RPI-X, gained a 12% 
reduction in operating costs from 1995 to 1999, averaging a 2% cost reduction per year.  Hence, expecting a 
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depreciation of effort beyond 40-50% per annum doesn't seem defendable (even if there are 
investments in high-tech technology), so the minimum value we choose for ρ is 0.6.  As 
there is no information about the possible values the persistence of the technological shock 
β may take (which can also vary from an industry to another) we investigate in the whole 
possible range from 0 to 1.  With regard to the standard deviation of the innovation σ  we 
look into a dispersion that allows a 2 standard deviations from 1.6% to 7.6% per year. 
 
The initial cost c0 is normalized to 1. The values of the demand parameters a and b are 
fixed following 2 rules:  1) the elasticity of demand at t = 0 is the one at c0, and 2) the one 
period consumer surplus when pt = c0 equals to 1 (fixing the surplus at any value will allow 
us to isolate the real effect of E).
13   
 
We look for the (locally) optimal regulatory lag between 0 and 40 years: it doesn't seem 
reasonable to look further since in practice we observe concession contracts of as a 
maximum of 40 years long. 
 
Not all the combinations of parameters are feasible.  As we noted earlier we will at least 
warrant that the steady state level of costs, when εt = 0 for all t, is nonnegative.  There are 
two groups of combinations that don't meet this requirement:  { ρ = 0.9, D = 0.028 } and { 
ρ = 0.9, D = 0.038 }.  We can justify their elimination on the grounds that it is generally 
true that the highest reductions in costs are due to investments in frontier technology that 
suffers a fairly quick depreciation. 
 
We have 175.000 possible combinations of parameters.  The solution algorithms were 
programmed in Gauss. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
maximum of 3.8% per annum in Pure Price Cap contracts seems reasonable (notice that the upper limit of the 
distribution of possible savings in costs can be as large as 7.2% per year, when d = 0.9). 
 
13   On this framework fixing the level of surplus has no impact on the resulting price elasticity: 
, for any p ≠ c0.  ) 1 /( 1 1 1 0 0 0 p E E p E E c c c p = = = − + =
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The problem is first solved as an unrestricted one, then it is verified that the resulting J 
satisfies the participation constraint of the less efficient type; if not, we find the optimum 
among the cases that permit its participation. 
 
The solution algorithm for Price Cap and Rolling Cap is the following one: 
 
1.  N quadrature points and weights { }
N
i i i w 1 , = ϕ  are obtained. 
2.  We fix a value for J between 0 and 41. 
3.  It is assumed that ε0 = 0, so both the regulator and the monopoly don't observe or 
have information about previous technological shocks. 
4.  With a fixed value of J we find the monopoly’s optimal effort sequence and the 
value of V ) , ; ( 0 J x i ϕ  using Linear-Quadratic numerical solution techniques, and the value 
of the consumer’s surplus for each ϕi . 
5.  Once obtained all N values of V ) , ; ( 0 J x i ϕ  and consumer’s surplus we calculate 
the regulator’s W associated to J, using a quadrature rule to solve the integral over ϕi. 
6.  We repeat steps 2 to 5 to obtain all 42 values of W. 
7.  Once those are obtained, the optimal J is chosen as the one associated with the 
maximum value of W (unrestricted maximization).  If exists more than one J that meets this 
requirement, we choose the smallest (if the regulator is indifferent among several values of 
J then prevails her subjective – maybe political – desire to pass over costs to prices as soon 
as possible). 
8.  We check if the participation constraint of the most inefficient type is met.  If it is 
not, we choose the minimum value of J that maximizes W  among the cases where 
) , ; ( min 0 J x V ϕ  ≥ 0.  If there are not such cases, then J is placed equal to 0. 
14 
 
The solution algorithm for the unregulated Monopoly, that also chooses prices and is not 
subject to price revisions (J = 0), is the following one: 
 
1.  N quadrature points and weights { }
N
i i i w 1 , = ϕ  are obtained.  It is assumed that ε0 = 0. 
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2.  We find the monopoly’s optimal effort sequence and the value of V ) ; ( 0 i x ϕ  
through Linear-Quadratic numerical solution techniques, and the value of the consumer’s 
surplus for each ϕi. 
3.  Once obtained the N values of V ) ; ( 0 i x ϕ  and consumer’s surplus we proceed to 
calculate W, using the quadrature rule. 
 
The detailed form of how to solve this problem by means of Linear-Quadratic numerical 
solution is on Appendix 1.  The analytic form used to compute the consumer's surplus that 
enters in the objective function of the Regulator is detailed on Appendix 2. 
 
 
5.  Simulation results and Conclusions 
 
The simulations result in the following distributions for the Regulatory Lags under Price 
Cap and Rolling Cap contracts: 
 
Distribution of the Good Regulatory Lag












































                                                                                                                                                     
14   Fortunately there were always such cases on the simulations, however some optimal lags resulted to be 0. 
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Distribution of the Good Regulatory Lag































The median of the distribution for both regimes is a lag of 2 periods.  However, note that 
the distribution of the Price Cap regime has more polar cases than that of the Rolling Cap 
(under Price Cap more contracts result in a short lag of 1 period and a higher lag of 41 
periods or more).   
 
These can be explained because of the monopoly’s incentives to reduce effort (even to 
negative levels) across periods at an increasingly rate under a Price Cap contract with  
intermediate lags, overcoming its benefits and favouring shorter lags (with no enough 
periods to expect a significant reduction in effort) and larger ones (with a high and more 
constant sequence of effort).  This incentives are not present in a Rolling Cap contract, so it 
was expected to have more intermediate lags. 
 
There exists some marginal cases when a lag of 0 is the best for the regulator (the case of a 
Cost Plus contract; we don’t take into account that this case is also accompanied by higher 
costs of auditing and control, giving it the best chance to succed but it didn’t).   A detailed 
analysis at the parameter level, not included, shows that the distribution of lags under both 
regimes are highly sensitive to the discount factor and less sensitive to the other parameters. 
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When we make direct comparisons of  regulator’s welfare between regimes we found that a 
Rolling Cap is superior to a Price Cap:  only in 0.3% of the cases Price Cap is a better 
option than Rolling Cap, and in 25.4% of the cases the regulator is indifferent among them.  
In none case the unregulated monopoly is a better option (under this work assumptions). 
 
This adverse result for the Price Cap contract can also be justified on the grounds of the 
relatively high incentives for the monopoly to diminish and even exert negative effort for 
intermediate lags, that favoured both shorter lags (with less surplus to pass to consumers) 
and larger lags (with a higher surplus that is however enjoyed by the monopoly alone) and 
diminishes the desirability of this kind of contract for the Regulator. 
 
Some preliminar conclusions 
 
The previous general results suggest that when there is no control on the level of costs, a 
Rolling Cap is a better way to regulate than a Price Cap because of the strong incentives to 
diminish cost reducing effort across periods or even deliberately rise the costs before a 
price revision under the last one.  An interesting framework where this result can work 
could be the chilean regulatory scheme where a monopoly is regulated on the grounds of a 
“competitive model firm”, that uses the best technology subject to demand and other 
demographic and geographical considerations (Galetovic and Bustos, 2000), whose costs 
are used to fix the price every 4 to 5 years as in a Price Cap.  However in practice the 
regulator always has to look at the actual costs information of the operating monopoly, so 
the later may have the same incentives we study here under a Price Cap regime. 
 
We are aware of two problems with the specification used here that we want to meet in 
subsequent work under a more general structure than the linear quadratic one:  the   
possibility of negative costs and effort.  The last one may have important effects on the 
desirability of Price Cap contracts.   
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APPENDIX I 
 
THE LINEAR-QUADRATIC FRAMEWORK. 
 
Given the assumptions of risk neutrality, linear demand and cost, and quadratic disutility of 
effort the dynamic problem of the monopoly can be expressed as a Linear Quadratic 
Problem that is summarized in general as follows: let xt be an Nx1 vector of state variables,  
ut a Kx1 vector of control variables and wt an Nx1 vector of i.i.d. innovations, such that 
E(wtwt') = I and E(wswr’) =0 for s ≠ r.  Hence, a monopoly should find a contingent plan 
 that maximizes:  {}
∞
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where R is a symmetric negative semidefinite matrix, Q is a negative definite matrix, W 
doesn't have any restriction, A and B defines the law of motion of the state variables and C 
relates the innovations to the system.
  
An additional condition is needed
 to find a
 numerical
 solution, 
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so it must not be expected that both states and controls jump to infinity (see Hansen and 
Sargent, 1998).  One way to solve this problem is using dynamic programming.  Let V(xt) 
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The conventional way to solve this problem is through iteration on V(.), that is to build a 
sequence Vj(xt) that converges to V(xt).  In particular let’s define: 
 
{ } ) ( 2 ) ( 1
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1 + + + + + = t j t t t t t t t u t j x V E Wu x Qu u Rx x max x V
t
δ    (4) 
 
and suppose that we begin the iterations at j=0 from any concave V0(x)  ( V0(x) = 0 ∀x, 
may work ).  It has been demonstrated (see Sargent, 1987) that the iterations on (4) take the 
quadratic form: 
 
j t j t t j x P x x V ρ + =
' ) (        ( 5 )  
 
where Pj and ρj satisfy the differential equations: 
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) ' ( ) ' )( ' ' ( '
1
1 W A P B B P B Q W B P A A P A R P j j j j j + + + − + =
−
+ δ δ δ δ    (6) 
 
) ' ( 1 CC P traza j j j δ ρ δ ρ + = +        ( 7 )  
 
Equation (6) is called the Riccati Differential Equation, and the resulting Pj is a symmetric 
matrix.  Notice that the iterations on (6) are independent of ρj and that the C matrix only 
affects the sequence of ρj  but not that of Pj.  Hence, the sequence of Pj is independent of the 
innovations of the system and coincides with that of the non stochastic problem.  
 
This is known as the “certainty equivalence” result that establishes that the solution of the 
stochastic problem is the same to that of the non stochastic one as consequence of the 
linear-quadratic structure of the problem.  This result doesn’t hold for other nonlinear 
structures, or when wt is not i.i.d. (when wt presents some persistence over time, for 
example, we can still define conveniently the state variables in order to obtain i.i.d. shocks 
but this makes clear that the results will differ from the nonstochastic problem).  This 
feature allows to search for the control variable policy function without considering the 
stochastic component of the problem. 
 
Let P and ρ be the convergence limits of (6) and (7) respectively, then the value function at 
the limit can be written as: 
ρ + = t t t Px x x V
' ) ( 
 
) ' ( ) ' )( ' ' ( '
1 W PA B PB B Q W PB A PA A R P + + + − + =











Using the F.O.C., the policy function for the control variables is given by:
15 
 
t t Fx u − =  
 
where  .  Notice that F is also independent of C, and 
therefore of the innovations.  To solve the whole system we iterate directly on (6), and then 
applying P to find F, ρ and V(x). 
) ' ( ) ' (




It is useful to define  .  It is left to establish the particular 
form of the states, controls and of R, Q, W, A, B and C for each regulatory regime
16. 
t t t t t t t t Wu x Qu u Rx x u x r
' ' ' 2 ) , ( + + =
                                                 
15   The S.
O.C.
 of the problem is  ) ' ( PB B Q δ + :  if t
he resulting matriz are negative definite
 then the  solution is a local
 maximum, that is 
also global because of the concavity of the problem
.  It is also important to 
check
 that all the




 inside the unitary circle so that the transition
 dynamics of states has a limiting
 stationary 
distribution (it
 is necessary to 
check
 the eigen 
values associated to those
 state variables that are not constants
). 
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UNREGULATED MONOPOLY’S PROBLEM 
 
Let’s define xt = { θt-1, εt-1, 1 },  ut = et  and  wt = ξt ~ N(0,1) (hence  t t t σξ βε ε + = −1  ).  The 
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MONOPOLY’S PROBLEM UNDER A PRICE CAP CONTRACT 
 
Following the special nomenclature and assumptions in the paper, we define 
{ } 1 , , 0 0
τ τ ε θ = t x ,   { }
τ τ τ
J t e e e ...., , , 2 1 = u  and  { }
τ τ τ ξ ξ ξ J t w ,....., , 2 1 =  (with  ~ N(0,1), I = 1,..., 
J).  After some tedious algebra, r  can be expressed as: 
τ ξi
) t , ( t u x
 
                                                                                                                                                     
16   For computational
 effects, we defined the state and control variables
 for the monopoly’s 
problem under distinct 
regi
mes in a 
different 
way
 than that of 
the theoretical part where we needed to
 obtain analytic expressions
 for effort and make 
the recursive
 nature of each problem 
clear
.   
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z .  The matrices of  
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Some additional calculations give us the equation of the law of movement for each state 
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τ τ τ τ ξ σ β ε β ε ε  
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MONOPOLY’S PROBLEM UNDER A ROLLING CAP CONTRACT 
 
Let’s define  {} 1 , , ,...., , , 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 − − − + − + − + − + − − + + + = t t t J t J t J t J t J t t e e e x ε ε ε ε θ ,    y  t t e u =
t t w ξ = , (with  t ξ ~ N(0,1)).  After some calculations, taking into account that  t ε  is not 
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defining the matrices of the value function as: 
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APPENDIX II 
 
THE CONSUMER SURPLUS 
 
The Expected Present Value of the Consumer's Surplus (E.V.C.S. ), given the assumed 




































Consumer’s Surplus generated by an unregulated Monopoly. 
 
In this case the monopoly also decides the price for each period before the corresponding 
technological shock is realized.  Define  ) / ( ~
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t
t t c b a
b
E S C V E  
 
The cost function at t can be rewritten in the following way: 
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t e c e c c ρ ρ θ ρ , with θ0 = 0, as the part of ct ~  that 
doesn’t depend on the shock












t t c c c ε ρ − − 1 0 t c βε , and: 
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17   This is only a
 practical simplification, since the optimal
 e
ffort is a function of the last 
technological shock.  We approximate
 the Consumer’
s 
Surplus for all the cases in the paper, to make them comparable,
 using




 for all t
, 
but 
respecting the value of 
ε
0.
   This simplification is very useful for the simulations and it approximates
 very well
 the consumer’s
 surplus, without 
altering the results.  The simplification 
respects the fact
 that as the regulatory lag
 increases in both
 Price 
Cap and Rolling Cap contracts
, 
their surpluses must
 converge to that of
 a Pure
 Price Cap. 
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in the simulations we use a single and sufficiently long serie of effort and costs (250 are 
enough) to obtain this. 
 
 
Consumer’s Surplus for the Monopoly under a Price Cap Contract 
 
Because the regulator fixes the monopoly’s price using information about past costs, the 
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i m J J
J e c c c  be the part of the unitary cost the 
monopoly arrives with to the next price revision and that doesn’t depend directly on the 
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as in the unregulated monopoly case we use a single sufficiently long serie (250) of unitary 




0 c c =  because it is the initial cost).  
 
 
Consumer’s Surplus for the Monopoly under a Rolling Cap Contract 
 
As in Price Cap, the price is known at the beginning of every period.  The Consumer’s 
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 ( the part of the unitary cost that doesn't depend on the shock, with θ0 






















t t c c c ε ρ , for t > 0 ( t t c c =  for t ≤ 0).  The consumer’s surplus 
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Once again, we use a single sufficiently long serie (250) of unitary costs to calculate this 
expression.  The reader can verify that at J = 1 both expressions for consumer’s surplus in 
Price Cap and Rolling Cap coincides. 
 























notice that it is independent of the monopoly’s type because the consumers never benefit 
from the savings in monopoly’s costs.  We also calculate the Producer’s Surplus for this 






) ( 0 0 c b a c
e  be the effort carried out at every period.  The Expected 
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APPENDIX III 
 
THE Gauss-Legendre quadrature rule 
 
The Gaussian Quadrature Rules are extensively used in mathematics to approximate 
numerically the value of complex integrals.  Many economic problems require some 
decisions to be based on the expected value (integral) of certain variables.  Who initially 
introduced Quadrature Rules techniques in economics were Tauchen and Hussey (1991).  
In general, we want to solve: 
 
b and a some for dx x f
b
a
, ) ( ∫  
 
A quadrature rule approximates the integral by means of a weighted sum of values for f(x), 
evaluated at some selected points. Both the points and weights are selected using the 
quadrature rule.  The quadrature rules allow for high order integration, that is not the same 
as high precision:  high order is accompanied by high precision when  f(x) is very “soft”, in 
the sense of being “very well approximated for a polynomial” (Press et. al., 1988).   
 
The rule replaces f(x) with f(x) times some function W(x).  Given W(x) and an integer N, the 










x f w dx x f x W
1
) ( ) ( ) (  
 
which is exact when  f(x) is a polynomial with degree between N and 2N - 1.  The abscissas 
correspond to the roots of the N - degree polynomial associated to W(x).  This polynomial 
is orthogonal to any other associated to W(x) with degree different to N.  Hence, if pN (x) is 
polynomial of degree N,  then   and equal to a 
constant when J = N.  The resulting weights wj are functions of these polynomials.
18  
N J for dx x W x p x p
b
a J N ≠ = ∫ , 0 ) ( ) ( ) (
 
When W(x) = 1, a = -1 and b = 1, the quadrature rule is a Gauss-Legendre one whose  
orthogonal polynomials follow the iterative process:  
 
1 ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 ( ) ( ) 1 (
1 ) ( , 0 ) (
1 1
0 1




N para x NP x P x N x P N




With this process we can obtain the polynomial of degree N whose roots in (-1,1) will serve 
as the abscissas  j x ~ .  The weights  j w ~  are calculated using this  formula: 
 
                                                 
18   For further reading about Quadrature Rules and orthogonal polynomials see Press et. al. (1988), Judd 
(1998) and Marimon et. al. (1999).  
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where PN’ is the derivative of PN.  In this case it can demonstrated that the abscissas and 
weights of the orthogonal polynomials coincide with those of the ortho-normal polynomials 
(that are orthogonals with∫ ).  [] 0 , 1 ) ( ) (




To integrate a function in the interval (a,b) we have to adjust the abscissas and the weights  
in the following way:  let xm = 0.5 (a + b) be the midpoint of the interval, and xl =0.5 (b-a) 
a half of its longitude, then: 
 
i l i i l m i w x w x x x x ~ , ~ = + =  
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d D
Hence
c c b a d D
f where




defining  [] 1 0 ) , ; ( ) .( . . . . ) ( 0 ≤ ≤ + = λ ϕ λ ϕ ϕ with J x V Cons Neto Exc E P V g , our 
problem is to approximate 







ϕ ϕ ϕ d g  times  .  We have already pointed out that 
g(.) for all the different combinations of parameters is almost exactly approximated with a 
polynomial of degree 9.  Hence, the Gauss-Legendre rule allows us to use al least 5 points. 
  
 